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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
DON A. ELTON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
• . 
• 
• 
. 
. 
. 
• 
. 
. 
Case No. 18151 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was charged with the crime of unlawful 
sexual intercourse, in violation of Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-401 
(1953), as amended, in that he had sexual intercourse with 
Evanne Collings, a female not his wife, on September 16, 1981, 
when Evanne Colll.ngs was under 16 years of age and more than 
three years younger than the appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was tried November 5, 1981, before a 
jury in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, 
George E. Ballif, Judge, presiding. The jury found the 
appellant guilty as charged. On December 4, 1981, the 
appellant was sentenced to complete a halfway house program in 
Salt Lake County, Utah. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent respectfully requests that the Court 
affirm the verdict and determinations of the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 16, 1981, the appellant, Don A. Elton, 
his brother, Norman Elton, and a friend, Scott Warenski, 
invited Evanne Collings, then 14 years of age, and Maria 
Miner, then 13 years old, for a ride (R. 80, 91).1 The 
group went to Payson, Utah, where Norman Elton purchased some 
beer {R. 81), after which they went to Santaquin Warm Springs, 
where Don Elton and Evanne Collings went swimming {R. 81, 93). 
The evidence indicates that Don Elton and Evanne 
Collings had met on Labor Day of 1981 (R. 83, 97), but the 
evidence is contradictory with respect to what was said at 
that time respecting Ms. Collings' age. Ms. Collings told the 
I" 
court that she had told the appellant that she was 15 years 
old (R. 83). Contrary to the appellant's claims, the 
I 
appellant introduced evidence that at the first meeting with 
Ms. Collings, the appellant had been told that she was 18 
years of age (R. 97). The appellant furtner stated that he 
believed, on September 16, 1981, that Ms. Collings was 18 (R. 
9 9). 
lAll references to the trial record will 
hereinafter be designated as (R. ) . 
-2-
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After swimming at the Santaquin Warm Springs, the 
group went to the appellant's house in Payson, Utah, arriving 
sometime that afternoon (R. 87). At about 4:00 or 4:30 p.m., 
the appellant entered a bedroom and told Ms. Collings to come 
in. He thereupon removed her clothing, removed his clothing, 
and the appellant accomplished an act of sexual intercourse 
with Ms. Collings (R. 88, 99). 
The appellant was charged, in an information dated 
September 29, 1981, with committing unlawful sexual 
intercourse, in violation of Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-401, and 
was tried before a jury on November 5, 1981. The trial court 
did not allow the appellant to present witnesses besides 
himself to testify'as to their belief that Evanne Collings 
1<-~-v~~,~ acted. as-•· if she rw as "'over -· 16, "-and •that her friend, Mari a- Miner, --r.r,.;.« ....... ,,.,,,. 
F·: ... ~ ~Eh ad -told···.the.m ._that -she_ was~·--19. :The ---trial court further 
refus.ed the appellant's attempt to testify that Evanne 
~ 
Collings caressed the appellant's leg and his crotch area 
prior to intercourse and that she was on top a good deal of 
I 
the time "and appeared to know what she was doing" (R. 105). 
·-· ~--~-The.appellant further submitted a ju.ry instruction which reads 
as follows: 
It is a defense to a charge of unlawful 
sexual intercourse that the Defendant 
reasonably and in good faith believed that 
female person was of the age of 16 years 
or older even though, in fact, she was 
under the age of 16 years. If from all 
the evidence you have a reasonable doubt 
as to the question of whether the 
-3-
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Defendant reasonably and in good faith 
believed that she was 16 years of age or 
older, you must give the Defendant the 
benefit of that doubt and find him not 
guilty. 
(R. 39). The court refused to give the appellant's proposed 
instruction. The appellant was found guilty as charged {R. 
50), and the appellant was sentenced to be referred to the 
halfway house at the St. Mark's facility in Salt Lake County, 
Utah, and successfully complete the program there. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE PROVED EVERY ELEMENT OF THE 
CRIME OF UNLAWFUL SEXUAL INTERCOURSE IN 
ITS CASE AGAINST THE APPELLANT. 
• 
The appellant argues, for the first time on appeal, 
that despite the fact that the courts of the State of Utah 
have -traditionally treated the crime of unlawful sexual 
intercourse as ac strict liability crime (See appellant's 
brief, p. 3), that since Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-401 (1953), as 
amended, under which the appellant was convicted, does not 
mention the words ''strict liability" or "clearly indicate a 
legislative purpose to impose strict liability," as required 
/ 
by Utah Code Ann., § 76-2-102 (1953), as amended, the crime of 
unlawful sexual intercourse requires a culpable state of mind, 
like that of any other crime. 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
As a general rule, this Court will not consider an 
issue for the first time on appeal. State v. Hales, Utah, 
#18083, decided July 7,1982; State v. Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 
160, 499 P.2d 846 (1972); State v. Starlight Club, 17 Utah 2d 
174, 408 P.2d 912 (1965). The failure of defense counsel to 
have properly and timely raised the issue of the culpable 
mental state required under the statute should preclude the 
appellant from raising this issue for the first time on 
appeal. Even assuming, arguendo, that the issue brought up by 
the appellant is properly raised, the appellant's argument 
regarding the culpable mental state required under the 
statutory rape statute is specious and without merit. 
Since the words "strict liability" are not used in 
-- ......... utah-~Code· Ann., § '· 76-5-401, under the requirements of Utah · · ,, . -.ni·• 
Code Anh., § 76-2-102, the appellant argues that in order for 
the crime of unlawful sexual intercourse to be considered a 
strict liability crime, the statute defining the offense 
clearly must indicate a legislative purpose to impose strict 
liability for the conduct. The appellant argues that it would 
be ludicrous to suppose that the Legislatu~e intended the 
crime of unlawful sexual intercourse to be a strict liability 
crime, stating that the Legislature would have to assume that 
all girls over the age of 16 realize the implications of 
sexual relationships, that no girl under the age of 16 
realizes those implications, that all girls under the age of 
-5-
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16 are innocent and naive, and that all sexual activity is a 
man's fault. 
No such inferences as to the Legislature's intent in 
passing the statute need be made, however. In State v. 
Huntsman, 115 Utah 283, 204 P.2d 448 (1949), this Court stated 
that the purpose of unlawful sexual intercourse statutes which 
establish the age of consent are to protect young girls from 
the illicit acts of the opposite sex. Although the age of 
consent was changed from the age of 18, under Utah Code Ann., 
§ 103-51-19 (1943), as amended, referred to in the Huntsman 
case, to 16, under Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-401 (1953), as 
amended, there is no indication that the legislative 
presumptions that young girls need protection from the illicit 
acts of the opposite sex and that such protect ion -may be given 
byBn unlawful~sexual intercourse statute-were in any way-
modified. 
In New York v. Ferber, U.S. , 31 Crim. Law 
--
Reporter 3139 (1982), the United States Supreme Court, in 
( 
upholding a New York "child pornography" statute, reaffirmed 
the longstanding rule that the State has a compelling interest 
in protecting the emotional and physical well-being of youth. 
See: Globe Newspapers v. Superior Court, u.s. ' 50 
--
U.S. Law Week 4759 (1982), and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
U.S. 158 (1944). The court emphasized that since the focus of 
statutes which protect youth is the persons protected, other 
-6-
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countervailing considerations, such as explicit First 
Amendment protections, must be outweighed in the balance of 
interests (See 31 Crim. Law Rptr. at 3142). 
Such consideration should also be weighed in 
interpreting a statute such as the one at issue in the instant 
case. The purpose and design of the unlawful sexual 
intercourse statute is similar to that underlying the child 
pornography statute in Ferber; the protection of youth from 
sexual exploitation. In view of this, the clear legislative 
intent to make "statutory rape" a strict liability crime seems 
clear, one in which the "knowledge and intent" elements, if 
such be required at all, are implied from the doing of the 
prohibited act. 
In State.-v.Vicars, ... Neb., 183 N.W.2d 241. (1971), the 
Nebraska Supreme Court, dealing with the issue, stated: 
.- ... - .... _.. Defendant further argues that the statute 
is invalid because it does not include 
intent or knowledge as an element of the 
crime and because the act which it makes 
criminal is one that cannot be discovered 
and avoided even through the utmost care. 
~- - .~ .. ~·.-""t-, ... -, - There· is no question the Legislature may ~--
enact criminal statutes which do not 
/ 
include criminal intent or guilty 
knowledge as an element of the crime 
[citation omitted]. To sustain a 
conviction under the statute, a defendant 
must have carnal knowledge of a chaste 
female. The intent is evidenced by the 
doing of the act constituting the offense. 
-7-
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183 N.W. 2d at 243. See also: State v. Superior Court of Pima 
County, 104 Ariz. 440, 454 P. 2d 982 {1969). 
It may be noted in passing that age 
is the essential element in statutory rape 
[citation omitted] and intent and motive 
play but little if any part in the 
substantive offense. 
State v. Ybarra, Mo., 386 S.W.2d 384, 386 (1965). 
The establishment of an arbitrary age below which 
youth are considered by the State to require governmental 
protection is not a valid ground for complaint by the 
appellant. The legislature must, of necessity, draw a bright 
line for determining the age of consent. The "obviously unjust 
.results" addressed by the appellant in hi~ example of 
consensual sexual intercourse one day prior to a girl's 
birthday resulting in a third-degree felony, and consensual 
pt' . .,, _.,_,,:i,-,;,,! ~,·fe-h intercou-rse ·one ... aay .... later-s·:being --ab-~.;:rnost a Class·~B misdemeanor -_L;.;._·-·· 
.. ..;..,1.,.•·, 1' 
go, then, not to guilt or innocence, but to mitigation after 
guilt is established. The legislature has not allowed for 
exce~tions to-the rule. The Supreme Court of South Dakota, in 
addressing this issue, stated: 
The arbitrary age of consent in these 
cases ·has been established by our 
legislature as a matter of publ~c policy 
for the obvious protection of young and 
immature females. We cannot properly make 
exceptions. Therefore, in a prosecution 
for alleged statutory rape a defendant's 
knowledge of the age of the girl involved 
is immaterial and his reasonable belief 
that she is over the age of eighteen years 
is no defense. 
State v. Fulks, S.D., 160 N.W.2d 418, 420 (1968). 
-8-
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The prosecution, by proving the fact of sexual 
intercourse between the appellant and the victim, while the 
victim was under the age of 16 and the appellant at least 
three years older, proved every element of the crime. Such is 
both the intent of the statute and the state of the law. 
POINT II 
SINCE A MISTAKE OF FACT HAS NO BEARING ON 
THE ISSUE OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE OF THE 
CRIME OF UNLAWFUL SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, THE 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE THE APPELLANT'S 
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING 
MISTAKE OF FACT WAS NOT ERROR. 
Contrary to the appellant's assertions, the trial 
court allowed evidence as to his belief of Evanne Collings' 
age. T~e appellant was allowed to testify that Evanne 
- • ~--.-.._-- -~~--~--- - _. _____ - ---- - --.- -.·--o---_ 
Collings had told· him ·that she was 18, arid ·tnat by the way she 
- - -· - ,. 
talked and -acted r he believed· that -she-was -1-8- f--R.-· 97, · 99---)-. 
The. trial court did not allow, .how~ev.er~; _the_ appellant to __ 
t:" 
present witnesse~ w_ho. ~ou~d test_~fy as to thei!'." beli~~ that 
Evanne Collings acted as if she was over 16, and that her 
( 
friend, Maria Miner, had told them .that she was 19. The trial 
- _ =- - ~-~- - - - ·-- - -_ - --l---- ~- - · ~- .:~:;,:s-~J$.~~~--~:::~~~~~~Z:=-~-~~~ -~i ~:?~~:- ;-·- - ·. - -- - --~--~-':?f:~~-- ~ -:==--::_ -;.f_:~:s-~:---_~--
C OU rt further refused the app-ellant's testimony, based upon a 
proffer by defense counsel, that Evanne Collings caressed the 
appellant's leg and his crotch area prior to intercourse, and 
that during the act of intercourse she was on top a good deal 
of the time "and appeared to know what she was doing" (R. 
-9-
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105). This refusal, coupled with the trial court's refusal to 
give a proposed jury instruction which stated in essence that 
a defense to a charge of unlawful sexual intercourse was a 
reasonable and good faith belief by the defendant that the 
female was of the age of 16 years or older, have been cited as 
error by the appellant. Since, in an unlawful sexual 
intercourse crime, a defendant's belief that the victim is 
over the age of consent is of no consequence in determining 
guilt or innocence, the trial court's refusal to give the 
proposed jury instruction and the court's exclusion of the 
evidence regarding the· appellant's belief as to the victim's 
age was not errora 
It is the overwhelming majority rule that a mistake 
or lack of information as to- -a victim's age- is_ no defense to-· a 
charge of statutory rape. --- See Mistake or Lack of Information 
- -- -- - --· -::--··. --- --=-:-:---::-=------
.. - -
as to Victim's Age as Defense -to Statutory Rape, 8 A.L.R. 3d 
1100. In Nelson v. Moriarty, 484 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1973), 
the Fifth Circuit, in deciding that mistake of age was not a 
defense in a statutory rape case, stated: 
Petitione·r ·clatms··.that his· h.onest~.bel~ief .. ::~~~~.i- __ ~~.· · 
that the prosecutrix of the statutory rape 
charge was over 16 years of age/should 
constitute a defense, of constitutional 
dimensions, to statutory rape. The effect 
of mens rea and mistake on state criminal 
law has generally been left to the 
discretion of the states [citations 
omitted]. The Supreme Court has never 
held that an honest mistake as to the age 
of the prosecutrix is a constitutional 
defense to statutory rape [citation 
-10-
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omitted] and nothing in the Court's recent 
decisions clarifying the scope of 
procreative privacy, [citations omitted] 
suggests that a state may no longer place 
the risk of mistake as to the 
prosecutrix's age on the person engaging 
in sexual intercourse with a partner who 
may be young enough to fall within the 
protection of the statute. Petitioner's 
argument is without merit. 
484 F.2d at 1035-1036. 
The appellant has cited only one case in support of 
his contention that mistake of fact is a defense to the crime 
of unlawful sexual intercourse; People v. Hernandez, 529 Cal. 
Rptr. 361,·393 P.2d 673, 8 A.L.R. 3d 1092 (1964). Hernandez, 
however, represents an aberration of the overwhelming majority 
rule, and has been followed with consistency only in the 
courts of California. Hernandez has been expressly rejected 
by the courts of Wisconsin, Kelley v. State, 187 N.W.2d 810 
(1971); Minnesota, State v. Morse, 161 N.W.2d 699 {1968); New 
Jersey, State v. Moore, 105 N.J. Super. 567, 253 A.2d 579 
(1969); South Dakota, State v. Fulks, 116 N.W.2d 418 (1968); 
Michigan, People v. Doyle, 16 Mich. App. 242, 167 N.W.2d 907 
( 
(1969); Maryland, Eggleston v. State, 4 Md. App. 124, 241 A.2d 
433 (1968); Massachusetts, Commonwealth v. Moore, Mass., 269 
, 
N.E.2d 636 (1971); Hawaii, State v. Silva, 491 P.2d 1216 
(1971); and Arizona, State v. Superior Court of Pima County, 
104 Ariz. 440, 454 P.2n 982 (1969). The Indiana Supreme 
Court, in Tolliver v. State, 372 N.E.2d 452 (1978), while not 
specifically referring to the Hernandez case, has also 
-11-
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affirmed the majority rule tha~ an erroneous belief as to the 
victim's age, however well-founded, is clearly not a defense 
to the crime of statutory rape. 
Some states, in fact, have statutorily provided 
that mistake of fact as to the victim's age is no defense to 
the crime of statutory rape. In Commonwealth v. Robinson, 
Pa., 399 A.2d 1084 (1979), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
specifically held that the Pennsylvania statute, which 
prohibited an accused from claiming reasonable belief that the 
victim was over 14 years old as a defense in a statutory rape 
case, was constitutional. 
In the instant case, the court specifically 
concluded that Utah law does not provide for a mistake of fact 
or reasonable belief as to the age of a statutory rape victim 
as a defense, stating: 
I believe Mr. Fitt (the prosecutor) is 
correct in the status of the Utah law at 
r 
the present time. There has been no 
amendment to our Code that would 
incorporate in any way a mistake of fact 
or·reasonable belief as to the age beiqg 
within the age of consent. 
I know that the past law, prior to the new 
Code, which was enacted back in the mid-
70 's was to the effect that there was no 
excuse as a strict liability case. It is 
all depending on the age and the fact of 
sexual intercourse. Now, I think as far 
as the criminal intent is concerned, I 
think probably just intentionally knowing 
that you are having intercourse with a 
given individual, who it turns out is 
within the age restrictions that would 
cause this matter to be a felonv. 
-
, 
-12-
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(R. 102, line 30; R. 103, lines 1-13). As both a reflection 
of the Utah statutory purpose for enacting the unlawful sexual 
intercourse statute and the overwhelming American majority 
rule, the court's conclusion of law was correct. Thus, the 
decision to exclude further evidence regarding the appellant's 
mental state than that which had already been given at trial, 
as well as the decision to refuse the. appellant's proposed 
jury instruction to the effect that mistake of fact was a 
defense, was not error. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the respondent respectfully 
requests that the judgment and conviction ·of the appellant be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this /).AtlC" day of July, 
1982. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
C' Attorney General 
77. 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
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